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Abstract 
The paper presents a new assessment methodology for owners and operators of transport infrastructure based on the results of the 
project “All-Hazard-Guide for Transport Infrastructure” – being funded by the European Commission DG General Home Affairs 
under the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Program 
(CIPS). It gives an overview on all possible hazards to transport infrastructure. These include (but are not limited to) man-made 
hazards (intentional and unintentional), extreme weather events and geo-hazards. Based on this, the paper identifies and develops 
criteria for the identification of important infrastructure associated to threat vulnerability and presents a methodological approach 
for the assessment of threats and structures, combining the information of the previous knowledge gained on threats and 
infrastructure characteristics.  
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1. Introduction 
The transport network in Europe is probably one of the most important systems for the European economy and 
society. Trans-national transport routes play a vital role in the traffic of goods and the supply of the population. 
Although most of the passenger and freight transport in the EU takes place via land transport, no coherent approach 
for the security of these transport modes is available so far. Any disturbance of these structures could lead to 
negative consequences for the population of the affected region and the economy as a whole. To this date, many 
different approaches for the identification of specific hazards for transport infrastructure exist or are currently under 
development (see SKRIBT (2012); SECMAN (2013) for the road sector; Kamburow et al. (2011) for the railway 
sector). While most of these approaches focus on single modes or specific hazards, no comprehensive and integrated 
compilation of all kinds of hazards for multi-modal transport infrastructure in Europe exists. Owners and operators 
of these infrastructures are faced with a large number of different kinds of hazards and need to decide on the 
priorities for the allocation of funds regarding measures increasing the availability and/or the security of their 
structures. Ongoing and completed projects have identified the need for a common European approach for the 
assessment of these hazards in a structured and comparable way (SeRoN (2012); SECMAN (2013)). In particular, 
previous research projects have shown the need for a comprehensive all-hazard catalogue for transport 
infrastructures based on an integrative approach (SECMAN (2013)).  
2. Main objectives 
The main objective of the AllTraIn project was to develop a practicable and user-friendly all-hazard guide for 
land-transport infrastructures which allows for a structured trans-national and holistic security-risk-management 
approach. For that, the project determined criteria for the identification of important transport infrastructures and all 
relevant hazards for transport infrastructures in Europe. Furthermore, criteria for the classification of transport 
infrastructure associated to hazard vulnerability were developed. By combining the information gained on hazard 
and infrastructure characteristics, a methodological approach for the assessment of structures and impacts of hazards 
was established. For that, a qualitative assessment procedure was developed to evaluate the vulnerability of various 
different transport infrastructures with respect to a set of different hazards. 
3. Method 
The general objective of the guide is to provide the user with a practical tool to assess all types of land-transport 
infrastructures regarding relevant hazards. The guide focuses on all man-made and natural hazards (all-hazard 
approach) and bridges, tunnels, embankments, cuts and centralized systems as infrastructure assets. Thereby, it aims 
at a general approach to combine both with each other in order to provide an assessment from a hazard perspective 
as well as from an infrastructure perspective.  
3.1. The dual entrance approach 
Figure 1 shows the components of the basic methodology. The idea behind the methodology is to combine all 
types of hazard with all types of road and rail infrastructure (assets). To implement this idea, the dual-entrance 
approach has been conceived, in order to allow the user to: 
x enter a specific asset and receive information about relevant hazards (first entrance) or 
x enter a specific hazard and receive information about specifically susceptible types of assets (second entrance). 
An example for an asset could be a special tunnel type (asset x). By using the assessment procedure, the user of 
the methodology is able to identify all single hazards that are of relevance to this special tunnel type. The other way 
round, starting from a hazard Y (for instance, flooding), the user is able to identify the asset types that may be 
significantly damaged if the hazard occurs in his network. 
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Fig. 1. The dual-entrance approach. 
3.2. The sequence chain 
Apart from the dual-entrance approach, a second guiding concept is the sequence chain. The prime purpose of the 
sequence chain is to establish a general framework for linking hazards to infrastructure elements. This goal is 
achieved by introducing a set of global concepts with links between these concepts. 
 
Fig. 2. The sequence chain and the underlying methodological approach. 
Figure 2 introduces the sequence chain forming the logical backbone of the Guide: 
x An initial hazard event (e.g. rain) causes a local hazard phenomenon (e.g. a debris flow). The causal link can be 
direct (rain causes debris flow) or indirect. The latter case is symbolized by the grey box with dashed contours in 
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the figure. In principle, there can be multiple intermediate steps. However, the approach is to focus on the initial 
cause and its final, local result progressing next to the asset at stake. In some cases, initial event and local 
phenomenon can even be the same.  
x The next step links the local phenomenon (the way in which the hazard materializes next to the asset) to the 
impact (the way in which the hazard acts on the asset). If the local phenomenon is debris flow – to stick with the 
same example – the impact would be obstruction, structural impact or operational impact (as outlined in 
Chapter 3). 
x While impact refers to the phenomena that act on the structure, it says nothing about the consequences. Whether 
there are any consequences and their degree of severity depend on the vulnerability and exposed value of the 
asset. The model focuses on local consequences, i.e. the damage inflicted directly and locally on the asset. They 
include repair and reconstruction costs as well as out-of-service time of the specific asset at stake. 
x Local consequences can lead to global consequences, i.e. impaired capacity of the transport network causing 
travel delay costs and loss of toll revenues. Global consequences are displayed in the sequence chain for the sake 
of completeness, but they are not within the scope of the guide. 
Figure 3 shows the concise definitions of the respective elements of the sequence chain and also illustrates the 
debris flow example mentioned above. 
 
Fig. 3. Sequence chain: definitions and example. 
3.3. Hazard identification for transport infrastructure 
Hazards are potential events which can compromise the security and/or availability of traffic infrastructure assets. 
When the array of possible local hazard phenomena is broken down into a list, a major difference can be made 
between man-made hazards and natural hazards. 
Man-made hazards 
Table 1 presents the list of man-made hazards, divided into those due to intentional and unintentional action. 
Many hazards can be the consequence of either intentional or unintentional action (e.g. fire). The scope of the All-
-Hazard Guide is limited to security issues. Thus, ordinary vehicle accidents are disregarded. However, ramming 
(intentional) and the threat posed by excessive vehicle dimensions or weight are exceptional hazards that are not 
covered by design codes.  
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Table 1. List of local phenomena: man-made hazards. 
Type of action Local phenomenon 
Only intentional Ramming 
 Sabotage 
 Theft 
 Cyber attack 
Only unintentional Excessive vehicle dimensions 
 Excessive vehicle weight 
Intentional/unintentional Blockade 
 Fire 
 Explosion 
 Hazardous release 
Table 2. List of local phenomena: natural hazards. 
Hazard category Local phenomenon 
Meteorological hazards Extreme wind Lightning 
 Extreme rainfall Sandstorm 
 Extreme snowfall Fog 
 Snow drift Hail 
 Sand drift Extreme high temperatures 
 Storm surge Extreme low temperatures 
 Icing  
Geophysical hazards Earthquake Tsunami 
 Ground deformation/displacement Lava flow 
 Ground subsidence Lahar 
 Soil liquefaction Ash cloud 
 Sinkhole  
Gravitational hazards Avalanche Rock fall 
 Debris flow Rock collapse 
 Shallow landslides Cliff fall 
 Deep-seated landslides  
Hydrological hazards River flood and lake overflow Groundwater flood 
 Flash flood Outburst flood 
 Urban flood  
Other hazards Toppled trees Blackout 
 Wildfire Rodents 
 Magnetic storm Crossing animals 
Natural hazards 
Table 2 introduces the list of natural hazards. The hazard category in the left column is based on the conventions 
applied within natural hazards research. Hazard categories are not congruent with the concept of initial events listed 
above. Avalanches, for instance, are categorized as gravitational hazards. Gravitation, however, is not the trigger or 
initial event or trigger in the sense of the sequence chain.  
1330   Ingo Kaundinya et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  14 ( 2016 )  1325 – 1334 
Many local phenomena are not triggered by a single initial event, but by a number of conditions. Thus, a local 
phenomenon can have both man-made and natural components at the same time, e.g. the case of a dam failure. In 
this specific case, it was decided to treat dam failure in the same way as other types of floods for the sake of 
methodological simplicity (i.e. as a natural hazard). 
3.4. Infrastructure categorization 
According to the basic conceptual scheme adopted in the sequence chain, after the characterization of potential 
events (hazards) that could compromise the security and the operational capability of the infrastructure follows the 
assessment of local consequences induced by the impacts on each type of infrastructure  
The overall goal is to identify the type of potential susceptibilities associated with the vulnerabilities of each 
infrastructure element, taking into account the type of impact. The impacts can also induce other consequences for 
the stakeholders and the community in general (global consequences), which are not taken into account. 
Within the scope of the methodology, a set of asset types was selected: 
 
x bridges, 
x tunnels, 
x embankments, 
x cuts and  
x centralized systems. 
 
Fig. 4. Main asset types considered. 
The first four asset types considered (bridges, tunnels, embankments and cuts) can be generally described as 
structural, considering that these form the hard physical part of the transportation infrastructure (Figure 4). Tunnels 
and bridges are used to cross different types of barriers. Tunnels are underground or underwater passageways, 
excavated below the surface (usually in mountains or urban/sensitive areas), while bridges are structures built to 
span physical obstacles, including bodies of water, valleys or roads. cuts and embankments are used to adapt the 
natural terrain to the requirements of the road/rail profile. In general, open road and rail sections can be categorized 
as either cuts or embankments or a succession of both. Cuts require the excavation of the natural ground to lower the 
surface level, while embankments are earthworks used to raise the surface level. All these asset types can be 
embedded in road, rail or mixed transport systems.  
A centralized system is a system shared by more than one asset which is of great important since it has an 
essential function for the asset’s operability, in particular, communications, monitoring or traffic control, security or 
even energy supply in the case of railway systems. Although these are not infrastructure types as such, they can be 
affected individually by all the hazards considered within this Guide. The occurrence of any hazard in a centralized 
system has similar impacts on one or more of the infrastructure elements defined, their potential negative 
consequences being more serious in the case of railways. 
1331 Ingo Kaundinya et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  14 ( 2016 )  1325 – 1334 
3.5. Susceptibility to specific hazards  
The infrastructure categorization is based on the analysis of existing operational transportation infrastructures. 
The infrastructure characteristics are considered for assessing hazard vulnerability through a common methodology. 
The mitigation and/or prevention measures already implemented at the time of the analysis are regarded as 
characteristics of the infrastructure. Also, when the measures are non-existent or insufficient, advice is given at the 
end of the analysis on which measures could be implemented to mitigate or prevent the impacts of a specific hazard. 
These measures are addressed in so called hazard fact sheets. 
Vulnerability is understood as the degree of damage that the infrastructure would sustain as the result of 
a particular impact. 
The infrastructure categorization process prepares the information required for the next step, which is the 
assessment of the local consequences. According to the methodology, this characterization is the result of the 
combination of two main groups of factors: 
x Type of impact on the infrastructure. Three types of impacts are considered: obstruction (to traffic), 
operational impact and structural impact. 
 Obstruction: the unannounced physical presence of volumes of foreign objects that wholly or partially 
occupy the useful space for the traffic in the infrastructure. Examples: snow falls or rock blocks and 
landslides. These foreign objects can also collide with vehicles. 
 Operational impact: the reduction, more or less significant, of the infrastructure equipment functionality 
essential to the traffic flow. Example: damage to a traffic control system caused by lightning. 
 Structural impact: Additional (static, dynamic) load on infrastructure and/or reduced structural resistance. 
Example: excessive vehicle weight may lead to the infrastructure element's failure.  
x Type of local consequence on the infrastructure. Two fundamental types were considered: damage, requiring 
repair and incurring replacement costs and interruption of service (or, out-of-service time). 
 Repair and replacement costs: physical damage to the infrastructure that requires the repair and (or) the 
replacement of components or even the partial or total replacement of the infrastructure element. These costs 
are considered likely to be quantified in a monetary unit (e.g. euro) or by dimensionless factors as a function 
of a reference exposed value of the asset. 
 Out-of-service time: total or partial interruption of traffic or normal service of the infrastructure, as part of 
a transport infrastructure network. This effect will cause different damage to users and the community, as 
well as to the entity that manages the infrastructure, and is thus a component of Global Consequence whose 
evaluation is beyond the scope of the methodology. 
For practical purposes, the analysis only considers the out-of-service time because this is an easier parameter to 
estimate than reconstruction costs, being less dependent on scale and country and also, in most cases, there is 
a correlation between the two types of local consequences. Therefore, it is assumed that out-of-service time is 
suitable to represent local consequence as a whole. 
The relationship between these two sets of factors depends on several vulnerabilities associated with each asset 
type and each hazard type. These vulnerabilities were grouped in a small set of factors: 
x Structural factors, including the vulnerability characteristics considered significant associated with the physical 
structure, the mechanical system that constitutes the infrastructure element. These characteristics will affect its 
susceptibility to the considered Impacts. Example: the type of structural material. 
x Natural factors, including the characteristics of the natural environment where the infrastructure element is 
situated and considered as significant in its impact-induced behaviour. Example: the geological characteristics of 
the site. 
x Traffic factors, including the main characteristics of traffic at/on the infrastructure element that could 
significantly influence the non-structural effects (disruption). Example: the mode of traffic, road or railway. 
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x Local operational factors, indicates the existence or not of a system of communications monitoring the 
infrastructure element or the traffic control, a security or energy supply system in the case of railway networks 
linked to a centralized system. 
3.6. Assessment methodology  
The task of the assessment methodology is to link hazards to assets in a meaningful way, i.e. so that reality is 
represented in a reasonable way and adds value for infrastructure operators. In order to meet this objective, the 
following steps are required: 
x The first step is to establish an understanding of how hazards, impacts and damage are causally linked to each 
other. The number of possible combinations between hazards, infrastructure sub-types and various conditions is 
vast. Therefore the concept of the hazard trees was developed in order to establish a model that can 
accommodate the complexity of this interplay while limiting the number of redundant and irrelevant 
combinations as far as possible.  
x After the model had been established and informed, the next challenge was to make the knowledge contained in 
the model accessible to the end users. To this end, a software tool (AllTraIn-Tool) was developed to enable 
users to extract information on relevant hazards for a given piece of infrastructure. 
The second entrance of the dual-entrance approach is selecting a specific hazard in order to obtain information on 
specifically susceptible types of infrastructure. To make this entrance accessible to the end user, hazard fact sheets 
were established for each hazard, again based on the assessment model. 
 
Concept of the hazard trees 
From an end-user perspective (front-end), the Guide is a tool that can identify relevant hazards for a given piece 
of infrastructure and vice versa – that can identify types of infrastructure susceptible to a given hazard (Figure 1). 
From a back-end perspective, this requires linking the hazards (local phenomena) to the infrastructure types. 
Given the multitude of infrastructure characteristics, the number of potential combinations can be very large. To 
generate the assessment model it is necessary to identify the relevant combinations efficiently. Efficiency is essential 
in the light of the next step, where each hazard-infrastructure combination is informed with expert knowledge on 
possible impacts and consequences. 
The selected approach uses the hazards (local phenomena) from Table 1 and Table 2 as a starting point. Its key 
advantage is that assets (infrastructure elements) are only sub-divided according to structural factors and other 
factors that are relevant to the specific local phenomenon in question. For example, dividing a railway embankment 
into electrified/non-electrified sections is highly relevant if the local phenomenon is icing but less relevant if it is 
snow drift. This approach can accommodate a discretionary level of detail, while at the same time helping to avoid 
redundant and void information. 
Figure 5 provides a template for generating and informing the assessment model for a given local phenomenon: 
precursors of the local phenomenon (disposition criteria, triggers, protective measures) are on the left, follow-up 
events and structural factors are on the right. Precursors can be split into further precursors, follow-up events into 
further follow-up events. In principle, this approach corresponds to a combined fault-tree and event-tree analysis 
(FTA/ETA). However, the right hand side of the approach displayed in Figure 5 is not an event tree in the strict 
sense, since the bifurcations are not based purely on events but on a mixture of structural factors and events. 
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Fig. 5. General layout of a hazard tree. 
The AllTraIn tool 
The hazard trees described in the previous chapter contain the information that is needed to identify the relevant 
hazards and consequences for a given piece of infrastructure (first entrance of the AllTraIn dual-entrance concept). 
The AllTraIn Tool allows the end user access to this knowledge online at www.alltrain-project.eu along with a short 
manual. 
In general, it can be said that the hazard trees are developed from the centre (hazard) towards the branches 
(precursors and follow-up events/structural factors). The app enables the user to do the opposite, i.e. 
x select a set of structural factors and follow-up events, and 
x select a set of hazard precursors (disposition criteria, triggers, protective measures), 
and receive information on possible hazards and expected consequences. Since a large number of hazard trees are 
processed each time the user selects a new combination of structural factors and hazard precursors, this process is 
not trivial. The AllTraIn tool is a wizard-like recommender mechanism which links assets to relevant hazards. 
Recommender mechanisms are software tools and techniques that suggest potentially useful items to a user. They 
are being used increasingly in civil engineering. This is because their users benefit in terms of both time and cost by 
making more accurate decisions with respect to available domain knowledge. The final visualized hazards are 
generated by merging the two resulting hazard lists. 
 
Hazard fact sheets  
The second task of the dual-entrance approach is to identify all the characteristics that make an asset susceptible 
to a given type of local hazard phenomenon (second entrance of the dual-entrance concept). Contrary to the first 
entrance (all hazards for a given asset), the second entrance is not made accessible to the user in terms of a software, 
but through fact sheets. These fact sheets give an overview of: 
x the general phenomenology (description), 
x the disposition criteria of the hazard, 
x the internal thresholds (triggering) or external triggers, 
x the relevance for different types of infrastructure, 
x possible protection measures. 
Hazard Asset type
Embank-
ment
Bridge
…
Protective 
measures
Precondi-
tion 1
Precondi-
tion 2
…
Condition A 
fulfilled
Condition A 
not fulfilled
Condition B 
fulfilled
Condition B 
not fulfilled
Impact 
type X
Impact 
type Y
Impact 
type Z
Out-of-service 
time = N1
Out-of-service 
time = N2
Out-of-service 
time = N3
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4. Results and conclusions 
The output of the AllTraIn project is a practicable and user-friendly guide which can be used by public and 
private owners and operators of road and rail infrastructures in Europe, as well as authorities responsible for the 
implementation of the regulatory framework for the safety and/or security of transport infrastructures.  
The guide enables to identify, on the one hand, which specific hazards might potentially have a significant impact 
on their respective infrastructures and, on the other hand, the infrastructures in the network which might be 
susceptible to specific hazards. With the help of the guide it is possible to qualitatively assess road and rail structures 
against all possible hazards to transport infrastructure, like intentional and unintentional man-made hazards as well 
as natural hazards. 
In the medium- and long-term the guide will contribute to a better coordinated strategy for the prevention, 
preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security-related risks for critical transport 
infrastructures in Europe. 
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